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Case Note
Bearing False Witness
Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No!
Committee, 957 P.2d 691 (Wash. 1998).
In 1992, the Washington Attorney General charged a political action
committee with violating a Washington statute1 that prohibited sponsoring,
with actual malice, "political advertising that contains a false statement of
material fact." 2 In Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119
Vote No! Committee, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the statute
violates the First Amendment when applied in the context of an initiative
campaign The court found that the statute infringed on a form of
expression that lies at the heart of the First Amendment: political speech.4
Subjecting the statute to "exacting scrutiny," the court concluded that the
state's "claimed compelling interest to shield the public from falsehoods
during a political campaign is patronizing and paternalistic .... At its worst,
the statute is pure censorship, allowing government to undertake
prosecution of citizens, who, in their view, have abused the right of political
debate." 5
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.530 (1998). The statute required proof by "clear and
convincing evidence." Id.
2. Id. See Don Carter, Foes of 'Death with Dignity' Sued over Ads, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, June 12, 1992, at B6. At issue was a leaflet circulated in opposition to a 1991
initiative. The measure would have permitted physician-assisted suicide for competent adults who
had been diagnosed with a terminal illness by two doctors and who requested such assistance in
writing in the presence of two witnesses. See Tom Paulson, Aid in Dying Initiative Is Rejected,
SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 6, 1991, at Al. The leaflet stated that the measure "would
let doctors end patients' lives without benefit of safeguards .... [Your eye doctor could kill
you." Washington ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 693
n.l (Wash. 1998).
3. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d at 699. The four justices who would have upheld the statute
nonetheless concluded that the leaflet at issue did not meet the strict standards for falsehood
established by the statute. See id. (Guy, J., concurring); id. at 701 (Talmadge, J., concurring). The
trial court had reached the same conclusion. See id. at 694.
4. See id. at 694-96.
5. Id. at 697, 698-99.
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At least nineteen states have enacted statutes prohibiting knowingly
making false statements in political advertising.6 Although some courts
have invalidated portions of these statutes,7 no court has previously found a
narrow prohibition of malicious false statements to be facially
unconstitutional.8 Several courts have found that challenges to the statutes
are governed by Garrison v. Louisiana,9 in which Justice Brennan wrote for
the United States Supreme Court:
[T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the
premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in
6. See Cleveland Ferguson, III, Comment, The Politics of Ethics and Elections: Can Negative
Campaign Advertising Be Regulated in Florida?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 463 app. at 501-03
(1997) (tabulating data on state statutes). For a survey of the state statutes and their interpretation
by courts, see Richard F. Neel, Jr., Note, Campaign Hyperbole: The Advisability of Legislating
False Statements out of Politics, 2 J.L. & POL. 405, 406-14 (1985). These statutes are rarely
enforced. See Jack Winsbro, Comment, Misrepresentation in Political Advertising: The Role of
Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 875 (1987). The prosecution of the 119 Vote No!
Committee was the first enforcement action under the Washington statute as amended in 1988.
See James Wallace, State Must Decide Whether Initiative Foes Misled Public, SEATrLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 28, 1992, at Al.
7. See, e.g., Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573, 578 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding
that an Ohio provision authorizing the issuance of cease-and-desist orders by an administrative
body, rather than by a court, violates the First Amendment); Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp.
87, 94-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that a prohibition on "misrepresentations" of any candidate's
qualifications, positions, or party affiliation is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague); State v.
Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332, 1336 (La. 1989) (holding that a prohibition on "scurrilous, false, or
irresponsible adverse comment" is unconstitutionally overbroad); State v. Jude, 554 N.W.2d 750,
753-54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a statute punishing dissemination of statements the
speaker knew or had reason to believe were false did not meet the First Amendment's actual
malice standard and was therefore unconstitutionally overbroad).
8. See, e.g., Pestrak, 926 F.2d at 577 (upholding an Ohio statute and noting that "false
speech, even political speech, does not merit constitutional protection if the speaker knows of the
falsehood or recklessly disregards the truth"); Vanasco, 401 F. Supp. at 93 (noting that
"calculated falsehoods are of such slight social value that no matter what the context in which
they are made, they are not constitutionally protected."); State v. Davis, 499 N.E.2d 1255, 1258
(Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (upholding criminal sanctions for those who knowingly make false
statements in political campaigns); see also 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d at 704-05 (Talmadge, J.,
concurring) (citing state court decisions that denied constitutional protection to calculated
falsehoods).
The actual malice standard was developed by the United States Supreme Court in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which held that libel suits brought by public officials
require proof that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for
whether it was true or false. Two concurring justices in the 119 Vote No! majority suggested that
the Washington statute might be constitutional if applied to false statements about candidates for
public office. See 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d at 699 (Madsen, J., concurring). None of the opinions in
the case noted that in those circumstances the statute must be constitutional under the logic of
Sullivan. In Sullivan, the Court was concerned that Alabama's use of the civil law of libel might
allow it to circumvent the First Amendment's clear prohibition of laws that criminally punished
seditious libel. The Court held, "What a state may not constitutionally bring about by means of a
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277.
Since Sullivan endorsed an actual malice standard for libel suits brought by public officials, see id.
at 279-80, a criminal statute prohibiting the same conduct must survive First Amendment scrutiny.
Otherwise the civil libel standard upheld in Sullivan would be an unconstitutional end-run around
the First Amendment.
9. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.
Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which "are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." '0
The Washington Supreme Court distinguished Garrison and a long line of
similar cases on the grounds that those cases involved private reputational
interests that were not present in the context of an initiative campaign."
This Case Note argues that although the Washington court was correct
to note a distinction between these two types of campaigns, it incorrectly
analyzed the interests at stake when, in initiative campaigns, citizens act as
legislators. In particular, the court overlooked the compelling state interest
in ensuring the accuracy of information that is transmitted to legislative
bodies.'
I
American law long has recognized that accurate information is an
essential predicate to the rational exercise of the lawmaking function.
Federal and state decisions have consistently upheld the extensive
investigatory powers of legislative bodies on precisely that basis. 3 In the
leading case of McGrain v. Daugherty,4 the United States Supreme Court
noted that such powers had been seen as essential corollaries of the
10. Id. at 75 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). Garrison
was held to be controlling precedent in Pestrak, 926 F.2d at 577, and in Vanasco, 401 F. Supp. at
91.
11. See 119 Vote Nol, 957 P.2d at 697.
12. An interest in the provision of accurate information to legislative bodies is distinct from
an interest in the rationality or integrity of electoral outcomes generally. For an argument that
freedom of speech should be balanced against a vital interest in rational electoral outcomes, see
James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge to
First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. C-m. L. REv. 892, 894 (1984). Justice Talmadge found that the
Washington statute furthered a compelling interest in ensuring the integrity of the electoral
process. See 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d at 708 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
13. The United States Senate and House of Representatives, for example, each have the
power to summon witnesses, compel testimony under oath, and subpoena documents. See 2
U.S.C. § 190m, 191-92 (1994). Individuals who refuse to comply with congressional subpoenas
can be fined up to one thousand dollars and imprisoned for up to a year. See id. § 192. Any person
who lies under oath to a congressional committee can be prosecuted for perjury, fined, and
imprisoned for up to five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994); see also United States v. Cross, 170
F. Supp. 303 (D.D.C. 1959) (holding a federal perjury statute applicable to testimony before
Congress). In 1996, Congress expanded the federal false statements statute to prohibit materially
false statements made to a congressional investigatory committee. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West
Supp. 1998). The statement need not be under oath, and the statute provides for a fine and a prison
term of up to five years. See id. § 1001(a).
14. 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
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legislative power in the British Parliament and in the colonial legislatures. 5
The Court concluded:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information-which not
infrequently is true-recourse must be had to others who possess
it.... [S]ome means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is
needed.
16
State courts have reached similar conclusions. 7 For example, in 1885,
the New York Court of Appeals found that "[t]he power of obtaining
information for the purposes of framing laws to meet supposed or
apprehended evils is one which has, from time immemorial, been deemed
necessary, and has been exercised by legislative bodies."' 8 This power was
"indispensable to intelligent and effectual legislation." 9 For the California
Supreme Court in 1929, modernity had only heightened the importance of
legislative factual investigation: " [1]n this age of new ventures and of large
concerns .... the necessity of investigation of some sort must exist as an
indispensable incident and auxiliary to the proper exercise of legislative
power." 2
0
Washington law similarly recognizes the importance of accurate
information to the legislative process. The state legislature has the power to
subpoena witnesses and papers.2' Any person who fails to appear or who
refuses to testify can be punished under the criminal law by fines of up to
five hundred dollars and imprisonment for up to six months.22 Such persons
can also be punished under contempt provisions, which authorize a fine of
up to one thousand dollars and imprisonment for the duration of the
legislative session.' Persons convicted of perjury before the legislative
15. See id. at 161; see also James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional
Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 159-66 (1926) (examining British and colonial
precedents).
16. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175. This language was approvingly quoted in Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1975). See also In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661,
671 (1897) (upholding congressional authority to compel the attendance of witnesses and compel
the disclosure of evidence).
17. For an overview of state court decisions upholding the investigatory powers of state
legislatures, see 72 AM. JuR. 2D States § 48 (1974). See also Annotation, Power of Legislative
Body or Committee To Compel Attendance of Non-member as Witness, 50 A.L.R. 21 (1927)
(citing state cases).
18. Keeler v. McDonald, 2 N.E. 615, 624 (N.Y. 1885).
19. Id.
20. Exparte Battelle, 277 P. 725, 730 (Cal. 1929).
21. See WASH. REv. CODE § 44.16.010 (1998).
22. See id. § 44.16.120.
23. See id. § 44.16.150.
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body can be punished by as much as a twenty thousand dollar fine and up to
ten years in prison.24 The Washington Supreme Court has upheld these
provisions, noting that "whenever the legislature has authority to enact
laws, it has corresponding authority to make necessary investigations for
the ascertainment of such facts as are a necessary predicate for the
enactment of the law ..... " 25
Implicit throughout this body of law is the idea that rational lawmaking
requires accurate, relevant information about the conditions of the polity
and the implications of proposed legislation.26 Lawmakers, of course, may
differ on the reasonableness of proposed legislative action, but decisions
made in the absence of such information, or on the basis of false,
misleading information, are irrational by definition. The threat of irrational
decisions is sufficiently disturbing that courts have shown little hesitation in
allowing legislators to compel whatever information is necessary to reach
an informed decision.
This expansive legislative investigatory power places a significant
burden on two forms of political speech: the speech of those who prefer to
lie to the legislature in order to further their own view of appropriate
legislation, and the speech of those who prefer to remain silent rather than
assist the legislature in its fact-finding capacity. No court, however, has
found that the First Amendment protects a right to lie or a right to remain
silent before a legislative body.27 As the Supreme Court has stated, "it is
24. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.20.020, 9A.72.010-020 (1998).
25. State ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, 185 P.2d 723, 728 (Wash. 1947) (citation omitted); see
also State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 191 P.2d 241, 245 (Wash. 1948) (upholding the
investigatory power).
26. Cf. STANLEY KELLEY, JR., POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING: PROBLEMS IN CREATING AN
INFORED ELECTORATE 9-10 (1960) (arguing that rationality in voting requires full information
about the alternatives to be voted upon and the effects of each); Gardner, supra note 12, at 897
(noting the importance of accurate, relevant information to rational voting).
27. The right to remain silent is protected by the Fifth Amendment in criminal cases in which
the testimony would incriminate the witness. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. This privilege extends
to testimony before legislative hearings. See Watdns v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957).
If Congress grants immunity for testimony, however, the witness cannot invoke the privilege. See
18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1994). In no case does the right to remain silent create a right to lie. See Brogan
v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 810 (1998) ("IN]either the text nor the spirit of the Fifth
Amendment confers a privilege to lie.").
The United States Supreme Court has also required that legislative investigations not unduly
infringe on individual associational rights protected by the First Amendment. In Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee, the Court held that there was no substantial relation between
a Florida legislative committee's request for the NAACP's membership list and the committee's
purpose of investigating Communist activity. 372 U.S. 539, 551 (1963). In Barenblatt v. United
States, the Court held that where associational rights "are asserted to bar governmental
interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing.., of the competing private and
public interests at stake." 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959); see also Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198 ("It is
manifest that despite the adverse effects which follow upon compelled disclosure of private
matters, not all such inquiries are barred."); United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1010, 1011
(D.D.C. 1951) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a law punishing those who refuse to
testify before or produce papers for Congress).
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unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its
efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It is their
unremitting obligation to respond to subpoenas ... and to testify fully with
respect to matters within the province of proper investigation." 28 The
overwhelming importance of "intelligent legislative action" clearly
overrides any First Amendment interest in an individual's right to lie.
II
During initiative campaigns, the people themselves act as a legislative
body. As the Washington Supreme Court has itself noted, "the passage of
an initiative measure as a law, by the people, is not the exercise of the
power of any different sovereignty than is the passage of a law by the
Legislature. Each is simply the exercise of the legislative power of the
state." 29 When the people act as legislators, they regularly confront issues
that are just as complex as those faced by elected legislators. In 1998, ballot
initiatives in various states included measures to rewrite campaign finance
laws substantially, create tax credits for air-quality improvements, and end
current utility deregulation plans." In determining the rules that should
govern initiative campaigns, it is therefore appropriate to turn to the laws
that govern legislative proceedings. By overlooking this body of law, the
Washington court failed to analyze properly the relevant interests at stake.
If there is a compelling state interest in ensuring the accuracy of
information transmitted to lawmakers when issues are presented in the
legislative chamber, it is hard to discern why that interest should disappear
when the lawmaking power is assumed by the citizenry. Indeed, this
interest may be even stronger in the initiative context. As one leading
scholar of direct democracy has put it, "the integrity of ballot issue
elections is too often compromised by misleading claims, phony statistics,
and misrepresentations to the voters. Well-publicized fines and penalties for
obvious violators of [laws such as Washington's] will go a long way toward
encouraging better-informed debate."31 In Washington, the consequences of
ill-considered initiatives are exacerbated by the state constitution's
provision that, during the first two years after its enactment, an initiated
measure can only be amended by a two-thirds vote of the legislature.
32
28. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187-88 (1957).
29. State v. Paul, 151 P. 114, 116 (Wash. 1915).
30. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Popularity of Ballot Initiatives Leads to Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at A22.
31. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL 239-40 (1989).
32. WASH. CONST. art. H, § 41.
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Although one could view the person or organization sponsoring a false
statement of material fact in political advertising as a legislator, in which
case the Constitution's Speech and Debate Clause might shield the
fabrications from punishment,33 it is more appropriate to view the sponsor
as a witness to a legislative body. The false statement of material fact does
not in itself advance any argument or express any idea. It is simply a
statement about the factual predicates underlying proposed legislative
action. As such, it more closely resembles testimony than it does the
deliberative and argumentative functions of speech and debate on the floor
of a legislative chamber. Such a distinction has been implicitly recognized
by federal courts, which have held that when Members of Congress testify
before congressional committees, they act as witnesses, not legislators, and
therefore no Speech or Debate Clause immunity applies.' 4
The argument for viewing the calculating liar as a witness is further
strengthened by the lack of other methods for dealing with deception in
initiative campaigns. Citizen-lawmakers who wish to investigate the factual
basis for proposed legislation cannot compel testimony under oath, cannot
punish contumacious witnesses for contempt, and cannot subpoena
documents or other evidence. As a practical matter, empowering individual
citizens to do any of these things would be thoroughly unworkable. Statutes
such as Washington's become necessary because these investigative powers
that courts have found so "indispensable" 35 to the proper exercise of the
legislative function are unavailable to citizen-lawmakers.
The Washington Supreme Court found that a statute prohibiting
deliberate lies in initiative campaigns serves no compelling state interest
and "assumes the people.., are too ignorant or disinterested to investigate,
learn, and determine for themselves the truth or falsity in political
debate." 36 By similar reasoning, laws against perjury before a congressional
33. The Speech and Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1, and its counterparts in state
law, see, e.g., 72 AM. JUR. 2d States § 55 (1974), provide legislators with immunity for any
speech or debate made in the legislative chambers. If the liar is seen as a legislator, one might
argue that his statements partake of a similar immunity. Cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 24-25 (1998) (noting a connection between the Speech and Debate Clause and the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of speech). The argument from the Speech and Debate
Clause, however, does not necessarily defeat a statute such as Washington's. The clause states that
members may not be questioned "in any other place" for speeches in chambers, U.S. CONST. art
I, § 6, cl. 1; it does not prohibit such questioning by the members of that chamber themselves. The
Constitution explicitly permits each chamber to determine its rules of procedure, punish disorderly
behavior, and expel members. l § 5, cl. 2. A legislative body could constitutionally prohibit
malicious false statements of material fact by members as a rule of procedure. Likewise, it could
censure or expel a member for repeated malicious lying. Washington's statute can be seen as
analogous to such procedural rules.
34. See United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1994); FEC v. Wright, 777 F.
Supp. 525, 530 (N.D. Tex. 1991). But see United States v. Durenberger, Crim. No. 3-93-65, 1993
WL 738477, at "1 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 1993) (declining to follow Wright).
35. See, e.g., Keeler v. McDonald, 2 N.E. 615, 624 (N.Y. 1885).
36. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d at 699.
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committee presumably assume that Members of Congress are too "ignorant
or disinterested" to learn the truth of matters for themselves. Yet courts
have consistently held that legislative bodies must have the power to sort
out truth and falsehood before making a decision. The law against perjury
before a congressional committee and the Washington statute are both
attempts to ensure the accuracy of information upon which a legislative
body must make a decision. Rather than recognizing this compelling
interest, the Washington court instead created the only sphere in the
legislative process in which unlimited deliberate lies are constitutionally
immune from any sort of remedy.
The Washington statute is narrowly tailored to achieve its purposes. Its
strictures extend only to advertisements. It requires proof by "clear and
convincing evidence" that the sponsoring person or organization knew the
statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for whether it was true
or false.37 The statute does not prohibit advertising that is merely deceptive
or misleading. It does not prohibit negligent mistakes. It targets only the
deliberate lie. This is the standard that juries must employ when
determining whether a citizen has violated the act and violated the trust of
her fellow citizen-lawmakers. It is a standard that is fully consonant with
the ideals of deliberative democracy that the First Amendment is intended
to foster.
I
In finding the Washington statute unconstitutional, the 119 Vote No!
court contradicted not only every court that has considered the issue but
also the essential holdings of a long line of cases on the nature and scope of
the legislative power. The court offered no persuasive justification for
punishing malicious lies to elected legislators with imprisonment and fines,
but cloaking those same lies with absolute constitutional protection when
made to citizen-lawmakers. Nor did it explain why citizen-lawmakers must
ferret out the truth without the benefit of even minimal protections against
fraud and deception-a burden no court has ever imposed on a legislature.
These distinctions make no sense as a matter of logic or of law, and they
ultimately undercut the very citizen-lawmaking function they purport to
protect.
-Carlton F.W. Larson
37. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.530 (1998); cf Robert M. O'Neil, Regulating Speech To
Cleanse Political Campaigns, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 575, 590 (1992) (stressing the importance of a
"clear and convincing" standard).
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